In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of strategic environmental policymaking with different degrees of product differentiation and different market structures, and examine how strategic voting decisions are affected by the choice of environmental policy instruments (tax or standard). We show that in a Cournot market structure, voters elect tax-setting policymakers who are more green than themselves when product differentiation and/or environmental externalities are more prominent. In a Bertrand market structure, they elect more green tax-setting policymakers than themselves. On the other hand, they elect standard-setting policymakers who are less green than themselves. The results confirm the advantage of the overall use of emission tax over that of emission standard regarding the welfare effect of strategic voting.
Introduction
In recent years, the international aspects of environmental policy have been significant factors in international and national politics. An archetypal example of this would be the Kyoto Protocol on combating global warming. Negotiation on trade and environmental issues, which constitute a large part of the World Trade Organization (WTO), are also gaining prominence in policy discussions. With regard to domestic politics, environmental issues often occupy an K. Hattori (B) Department of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8, Osumi, Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka 533-8533, Japan e-mail: hattori@osaka-ue.ac.jp important position in several policy pledges and elections. 1 Some citizens are interested not only in the national environment but also in the global environment, and they expect elected politicians to demonstrate the country's initiative by establishing environmental policies on international environmental problems.
It is well known that there are considerable strategic relationships among countries for policymaking on global environmental problems. In this context, previous theoretical studies have shown that, taking international trade and transboundary pollution into account, governments may have two types of incentives to impose ineffectively less stringent environmental regulations: ecological-dumping and free-riding incentives. 2 The former represents government incentives to relax domestic environmental regulations for the purpose of shifting profits from foreign to domestic firms, and the latter represents incentives to free ride on a foreign country's efforts to reduce transboundary pollution. Thus, the noncooperative behavior of governments may lead conceptually to a "race to the bottom" in environmental policymaking.
If voters in democratic countries are able to perceive the above-mentioned intergovernmental interdependencies, and can anticipate how their choice of policymakers will influence the foreign country's policy, then they may strategically elect policymakers who institute environmental policies. This strategic voting of democratic people may change the strategic relationships among governments and the behavior of the policymakers. In the context of the relationship between political systems and environmental policies, Congleton (1992 Congleton ( , 1996 empirically show that authoritarian regimes will adopt less stringent domestic environmental standards than democratic regimes. Furthermore, Murdoch and Sandler (1997) present evidence that the extent of political and civil freedom had a positive impact on reductions in CFC emissions in the late 1980s. These results provide evidence for the relationship between a democratic political system and the environmental policies it sets. 3 What influence does the democratic process have on the strategic relationship among governments regarding environmental policies? Previous studies have analyzed citizens' incentives for strategic voting within the representative democracy framework of Besley and Coate (1997, 2003) . 4 Siqueira (2003) constructs a two-country delegation model where voters in each country elect a policymaker who noncooperatively implements a consumption tax on emission generating goods at a later stage. In this framework, he shows that a median-voter will tend to prefer a policymaker who lays less emphasis on environmental pollution than he or she does, and overall, the outcome will be inferior to the one derived in the absence of delegation (or election). Subsequently, Buchholz et al. (2005) construct a model where each democratically elected government decides its output of environmentally-harmful products cooperatively or noncooperatively, and they compare the outcome under a cooperative policy (an international environmental agreement) with that under a noncooperative policy. In both cases, voters strategically choose a policymaker who is less eco-friendly than the voters themselves. In other words, strategic voting intensifies the free-riding incentives of 1 For example, in several northern European nations, green interest groups have organized their own political parties and have become part of a governing majority. 2 For further details on international trade and strategic environmental policy, see, for example, Ulph (1992, 1996a,b) , Barrett (1994) , Kennedy (1994 ), Conrad (1996 ), and Rauscher (1997 , 2005 , among many others. 3 For a review and assessment of the extensive literature on the political determination of environmental regulation, see Oates and Portney (2003) . Furthermore, using the modern tools of economics and public choice, Congleton (1996) examines the political and economic factors that generate environmental policy. 4 The representative democracy framework has a similar structure to the strategic delegation model originated by Fershtman and Judd (1987) , and is frequently used in a wide range of studies (e.g., Laussel and Riezman 2005) .
